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Countering the Threat 
The 1980's have already been labelled "The 
Dangerous Decade" -and if  anyone doubted 
that point, he would have been convinced by 
the new onslaught of inflation which affected 
the national economy in the very opening 
months of  the new decade. Last week-end, in 
an unprecedented step to counter the threat, 
the Administration re-opened the books on its 
1981  budget document only a month and a 
half after sending it to Congress, and 
announced a series of spending cuts and 
revenue increases designed finally to bring 
about a balanced budget in the new year. In a 
companion measure, the Federal Reserve 
announced a series of steps to make credit 
more costly and less available, thus support-
ing the Fed's major credit-tightening move of 
last October 6. 
The Administration originally had projected a 
$16-billion deficitforfiscal1981, butthe 
financial markets reacted adversely to the 
continued diet of red ink, especially since 
some estimates had suggested that the actual 
deficit would be almost twice the Administra-
tion's estimate. Hence, the President moved 
last week-end to bring an inflation-fighting 
balanced budget within sight again, by cutting 
at least $13 billion from planned Federal out-
lays, and by imposing a $4.64-per-barrel 
"gasoline conservation fee" on imported oil. 
In addition, the President imposed an 
immediate freeze on government hiring, and 
asked Congress to institute withholding pro-
cedures for dividend and interest payments. 
Fed's response 
The Federal Reserve already had moved to 
counter inflation last October 6, when it 
announced its resolve to slow the rate of 
monetary growth, and introduced new oper-
ating techniques designed to reach that goal. 
The new policy steps, in what could be called 
a 9-10-15-16 cadence, should help extend 
the impact of its earlier credit-tightening mea-
sures throughout the financial community. 
The Fed asked not only commercial banks, 
but other business lenders as well, to restrict 
the growth of business lending, so that such 
loans don't grow faster than the 9-percent top 
of the range targeted for bank-credit growth. 
The Board also increased, to 10 percent, the 
reserve requirement on the growth of "man-
aged liabilities" (such as large time deposits 
and dollars borrowed overseas), and mean-
while extended that 1  O-percent requirement 
to nonmember banks for the first time. To 
slow consumer-credit growth, the Fed estab-
lished a 15-percent "special deposit" require-
ment on certain consumer-related credit 
extensions of banks, finance companies, re-
tailers, gasoline firms and travel companies-
and meanwhile imposed a 15-percent reserve 
requirement on increases in assets of money-
market mutual funds. Finally, the System 
imposed a 16-percent  discount rate (the basic 
13-percent rate plus a 3-percent surcharge) 
on those large banks which resort too fre-
quently to the Fed's discount window-
specifically, more than one week in a row or-
more than four weeks in any calendar quarter. 
Cause of problems 
The restrictive policy measures imposed at 
the beginning of  the 1980's reflect a necessary 
response to the dismal economic record of 
the 1970's. Actually, the record of the past 
decade in some respects was not too bad. For 
example, real disposable per capita income-
a key measure of individual well-being-
increased 28 percent in the 1970's, or almost 
as much as it did in the 1960's. Butthe nation 
ate up much of its seed corn in reaching its 
higher standard of living. Real business invest-
ment increased only one-third as fast, and 
worker productivity less than half  as fast, as in 
the preceding decade. Worse still, the nation 
became increasingly dependent for its raw 
materials on unstable and expensive sources 
of supply, as evidenced by a 15-fold rise in 
the price of  Middle Eastern oil overthe decade. --.-... - .. ---.. ~.-..  --..  __  .... -..... _  .. '-- ....  -.-.......•.... --.. -- .... --_.-._  ........... _--... - .......•.•.. _  ......... _  .•.  -.- ..... -..  _  .•..........•......• _  •........... _  ... -.. 
The public sector accounted for much of the 
demand stimulus in the economy during the 
1970's, as massive Federal spending 
increases outpaced tax revenues and created 
red ink on the books for every single year of 
the decade. Indeed, the combined Federal 
deficit for the decade, $315 billion, matched 
the combined total for the entire earlier 
history of the Republic. Inflation became an 
ever-worsening problem, reflecting the 
prolonged series of Federal deficits, the 
stimulative monetary expansion that 
sometimes accommodated them, and a 
series of  supply-related shocks from OPEC oil 
and other sources. Consumer prices thus 
practically doubled over the course of the 
decade, in the worst peacetime inflation in 
the nation's history (see chart). 
Oil-price problem 
Much of the 1980-style inflation can be 
traced to the numbing series of OPEC price 
increases occuring during the 1970's, which 
culminated in the doubling (or more) of 
OPEC prices in 1979 alone. In dollar terms, 
the U.S. paid about $6 billion a year to the oil 
exporters prior to the 1973 embargo, but it 
now is payi ng them about $1 00 bi II ion a year 
for imported crude supplies. The latest price 
upsurge has meant a 42-percent rise in 
energy costs for U.S. consumers since a year 
ago; as well as steep increases for producers 
which will filter through the economy for 
some time to come. And despite some signs 
of  a short-term oil glut, the structural changes 
developing in the international oil market 
provide little hope of solace for u.s. 
consumers in the future. 
The record of 1979 suggests that an increasing 
percentage of  crude oil will be handled in the 
future by the producing nations' own oil 
companies rather than by the major inter-
national companies. (Industry sources claim 
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that the major internationals now control 
distribution of  only about 45  percent of 
OPEC crude-down from a 70-percent share 
as recently as 1975.) Government-to-
government sales thus should increase, 
bringing about an increased uncertainty of 
supply. Many more nations could follow the 
Iranian example, gaining increased revenue 
even while sharply reducing supply. And a 
growing number of consuming nations, 
major oil companies and independents will 
compete fiercely for available supplies, 
feeding the price spiral even more. 
Nonetheless, the u.s. has already provided 
evidence that it can ad just to a world of higher 
energy prices. Even with limited price decon-
trol, per capita energy usage increased only 
5 percent between "1972 and 1978, compared 
to a 21-percent increase in the preceding 
six-year period. (In volume terms, that 
difference amounted to about 6 million 
barrels a day.) And by decontrolling domestic 
crude-oil prices-a process to be completed 
over the next 18 months-thegovernment 
will be sending consumers an unambiguous 
signal to conserve, while. sending producers 
an equally unambiguous signal to develop 
more domestic energy supplies. 
Budget problem 
Policymakers, while facing the likelihood of 
ever-rising energy prices, are hence being 
forced to redouble their efforts to reduce 
inflationary pressures from other sources. 
One prime target is the Federal budget, which 
has aggravated the inflation problem with its 
deficit-spending stimulus during the recent 
cyclical expansion. Indeed, much of the 
current run-up in inflation expectations could 
be traced to the belief that our budgetmakers 
had lost control of that engine of inflation. 
The fears about a runaway budget surfaced 
before the ink was dry on the basic docu-
ment, when it became apparent that Federal 
spending this year would rise to 22.4 percent 
of GNP-instead of amounting to a smaller 
share, as previously believed-and would 
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more. Some critics complained that the 
budget would remain unbalanced even in the 
face of more than $50 billion in tax 
increases-either from the social-security 
tax, the windfall-profits tax, or inflation-
related boosts in personal-tax revenues. And 
some observers, when comparing the latest 
budget document with last year's, noted that 
projected outlays for 1984 had jumped 
almost one-fourth, to $839 billion, just 
within the one-year interval between the 
publication of those two documents. 
Real  increases in defense spending make it 
difficult to reach a balanced budget, which 
was the primary goal of last week's anti-
inflation budget exercise. But many observers 
are calling on Congress to make even steeper 
cutbacks than now projected, as a means of 
reducing the government sector's excessive 
demands on the nation's resources. The 
National Association of Business Economists, 
in a recent study, noted that Congress in 1978 
passed five times as many bills that 
contributed to inflation as did the reverse. 
Again, the Congressional Budget Office 
recently listed58 areas where budget 
cutbacks were possible-including, for 
example, the modification of indexing 
requirements for social-security benefits and 
other Federal programs, which could yield 
savings of $70 billion over a five-year period. 
The problem, of course, is that such cutbacks 
are as politically difficult to enforce as they 
are economically necessary. 
Monetary response 
Monetary policy meanwhile has a crucial 
role to play in restoring price stability, 
especially in view of the fact that excess 
money creation helped create the problem, 
in the wake of the excess credit demands 
generated by Federal deficit financing and 
otherforces. Overthe 1975-79 business 
expansion, the M-2 measure of the money 
supply grew at more than a 10V2-percent 
annual rate-not quite as fast as in the 
1970-74 period but half again as fast as in the 
less inflationary period of the 1960's. 
Recognizing that price stability requires a 
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progressive reduction in money-supply 
growth, the Fed moved aggressively last 
October 6 to enforce its tight-money policy 
decisions, especially by giving more 
emphasis to controlling bank-reserves 
growth, and giving less emphasis to 
minimizing short-term fluctuations in interest 
rates. And the pol icy sh ift has had good 
results; the M-2 money.supply has grown at 
less than an 8-percent annual rate since 
October 6, compared to more than a 
1  O-percent growth rate in the preceding 
six-month period. 
The Fed's basic policy has needed rein-
forcement, however, in view of the'heavy 
credit demands generated by inflation 
expectations in recent months. In last 
weekend's pol icy statement, the Board of 
Governors said that lithe effectiveness and 
speed with which appropriate restraint can 
be achieved without disruptive effects on 
credit markets will be facilitated by a more 
formal program of voluntary restraint by 
important financial intermediaries." 
The Fed at that time encouraged lenders,to 
maintain availability of funds to small 
husinesses, farmers, home-buyers and others 
who don't have access to other forms of 
financing. At the same time, it discouraged 
lenders from several types of activities-
making unsecured loans to consumers (such 
as credit-card loans), financing corporate 
takeovers or mergers, financing purely 
speculative holdings of commodities or 
precious metals, or expanding commitments 
for back-up lines in support of commercial 
paper. Yet, despite this increased attention to 
bank lending policy, the Fed continues to 
base its credit-restraint program primarily on 
its control of bank reserves and other 
traditional instruments of monetary policy. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily figures 
Member Bank Reserve. Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( -) 
federal funds** 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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+  64 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
15,978  +  13.1 
16,165  +  16.1 
4,351  +  14.9 
8,851  +  24.6 
3,689  +  17.7 
270  - 15.7 
1,035  13.4 
848  +  5.8 
4,345  +  10.8 
1,732  +  5.8 
1,910  - 6.4 
9,050  +  17.8 
9,932  +  24.1 






** The revised  series on  Federal  Funds  and  Repurchase Agreement  Borrowings  (FR 2415)  is  available on 
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